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not able to absorb the additional workers. Comparing the two
instruments, cuts in public hiring increase unemployment per-
sistently in this environment, while wage cuts can reduce it.
Regions with higher mobility of labor between the two sectors
are able to consolidate more effectively. Price flexibility is also
key at the zero lower bound: for a higher degree of price rigid-
ity in the periphery, consolidation becomes harder to achieve.
Consolidations can be self-defeating when the public good is
productive.
JEL Codes: E32, E62.
1. Introduction
Fiscal consolidation policies implemented in the euro area in recent
years have placed special emphasis on reducing the public wage bill,
which represents a sizable component of the government budget.1
The fall in the nominal government wage bill has been particu-
larly pronounced in periphery countries of the euro area, such as
Ireland, Greece, and Portugal (see figure 1), and has come from cuts
in both wages and the number of employees in the public sector (see
figure 2).2,3 At the same time, the euro area has been experiencing
a prolonged period of inflation uncertainty: with monetary policy
constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), inflation has remained
below the European Central Bank’s medium-run objective for some
time. This environment of low inflation has important implications
for the design and implementation of fiscal policy. This paper offers
a positive analysis of the relative effectiveness of cutting wages ver-
sus cutting hiring for reducing the public wage bill in a monetary
union when inflation is low.
1Before the crisis, the government wage bill accounted, on average, for almost
25 percent of total public spending and more than 10 percent of GDP, and almost
15 percent of the labor force in the euro area was employed in the public sector
(see Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010).
2These policies have been implemented through reducing overtime pay,
retrenching specific indemnities or benefits, implementing attrition rules to reduce
new hiring, or simply by outright layoffs and pay cuts. In Greece, for example, a
10 percent cut across all public-sector wages was legislated in 2010, followed by
further cuts. In Spain, the attrition rule allowed a new hire for every ten exits.
3In the online version of this paper, available at http://www.ijcb.org, lines in
all figures are differentiated by color in addition to being solid, dashed, and so on.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the Public Wage Bill
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Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Wages and salaries in the public sector, current prices. For comparability,
country series have been normalized to 100 in 2009.
Historically, periods of high inflation have been used to reduce
debt-to-GDP ratios—for example, in many western countries
following both the First and Second World War (Reinhart, Rein-
hart, and Rogoff 2015). On the contrary, low inflation, all else equal,
raises deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios by reducing the growth in
nominal GDP. Debt dynamics would be left unchanged if nominal
interest rates adjust by the same magnitude as inflation, thus leav-
ing real rates unchanged. Instead, when nominal rates have hit the
ZLB, falling inflation leads to rising real interest rates, making it
more difficult to reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Recent studies, both theoretical and empirical, have looked at a
less direct effect of low inflation on fiscal policy, namely the impact of
the ZLB on fiscal multipliers. Much of the literature has found that
fiscal multipliers are higher when monetary policy is constrained.4
4Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Coenen et al.
(2012), and De Long and Summers (2012) find that the government spending
multiplier increases significantly at the ZLB. Erceg and Linde´ (2013) show that
the magnitude of the output contraction induced by spending-based consolida-
tion is roughly three times larger when monetary policy is constrained by the
ZLB. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) report substantially higher multipliers
in countries operating under fixed exchange rates, another form of constrained
monetary policy.
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Figure 2. Changes in Public-Sector Wages
and Employment
A.
B.
Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations.
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Based on this principle, several papers discuss the potential role
of fiscal stimulus in alleviating a ZLB crisis: Correia et al. (2013)
suggest a stimulus strategy based on consumption taxation, and
Rendahl (2016) focuses on how expansionary fiscal policy can best
exploit the amplification of labor market movements at the ZLB.
The converse of these arguments is that attempting to carry out
fiscal consolidation in a liquidity trap can be very costly, and even
self-defeating.
Another important interaction between fiscal and monetary pol-
icy is the fact that inflation can have a different impact, in terms of
both size and timing, across different components of public expen-
diture and revenue. Jalil (2012) shows that the differences between
the estimated multipliers of government spending and taxation can
be explained by the differential response of monetary policy. Erceg
and Linde´ (2013) find that, at the ZLB, a tax-based consolida-
tion is less costly in the short run than a spending-based consoli-
dation, while the opposite is true when monetary policy is uncon-
strained. McManus, Ozkan, and Trzeciakiewicz (2014) demonstrate
that the ZLB has different effects on different fiscal consolidation
instruments, and should therefore be considered when designing fis-
cal policy. We extend this literature by comparing the effectiveness
of two different instruments for reducing the public wage bill at
the ZLB and compare them with traditional instruments of fiscal
consolidation considered in the existing literature.
We consider a New Keynesian model of a two-block monetary
union, calibrated for the periphery and core of the euro area. In
order to build a complete model of the labor market, we incor-
porate both search-and-matching frictions, leading to involuntary
unemployment, and an endogenous labor force participation deci-
sion, leading to voluntary unemployment. We allow the government
to hire public employees to produce a public good. Following Erceg
and Linde´ (2013) and Pappa, Sajedi, and Vella (2015), we compare a
given public debt consolidation through two alternative fiscal instru-
ments, namely public wage cuts and public vacancy cuts, in normal
times and in a low-inflation environment.5
5An example of fiscal consolidation through the public wage bill in normal
times comes from the German economy. In 2000, spending cuts amounted in
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In normal times, cuts in the public wage bill using either
instrument cause a reallocation of labor towards the private sector,
facilitating hiring and leading to a fall in the private wage in the
medium run. This induces an internal devaluation: by increasing
the competitiveness of the private sector of the periphery, the con-
solidation leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Together
with the positive wealth effect of the cut in government spending,
which raises private demand, this boosts private output. Both types
of consolidation bring about a fall in the unemployment rate. Public
wage cuts lead to a larger fall in unemployment as the private sec-
tor quickly absorbs the increased share of jobseekers, while public
vacancy cuts lead to a more sluggish adjustment in the labor market.
Comparing with the traditional instruments of fiscal consolidation
in the existing literature, both tax hikes and spending cuts tend to
decrease private output. Tax hikes reduce labor force participation,
increasing the private wage and marginal costs for firms. Spending
cuts, although they crowd in private consumption and investment,
induce a reduction in labor supply, which leads to a fall in vacan-
cies and employment in the private sector, and counterbalances the
positive wealth effect of the consolidation.
In a low-inflation environment, induced by negative demand
shocks and a ZLB constraint on monetary policy, the government
debt-to-GDP ratio rises, and, hence, a significantly larger cut in the
public wage bill is required. Furthermore, with the contraction in
demand, the private sector is much more limited in its ability to
absorb jobseekers leaving the public-sector job search, and private
employment falls during the liquidity trap. Still, the reallocation
of jobseekers after a public wage cut quickly reverses the path of
private employment by reducing labor costs, and decreases unem-
ployment in the medium run. Public vacancy cuts do not induce
a strong reallocation of jobseekers and reduce public employment
more significantly. As a result, vacancy cuts increase unemployment
in the medium run. Again, standard fiscal instruments would deepen
the recession induced by the negative demand shocks relative to
consolidation through the public wage bill.
Germany to DM 30.1 billion, or 0.75 percent of GDP, involving mainly the
public-sector wage bill, social programs, and subsidies.
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We run a series of alternative simulations to investigate the mech-
anisms at play in our model. First, we find that the ability of job-
seekers to reallocate their search is of key importance: rigidities in
the mobility of labor between the public and private sectors mitigate
the positive effects of the fiscal consolidation on private employment
after the liquidity trap, making consolidation itself more difficult
to achieve. Second, price flexibility is crucial for the success of the
fiscal consolidation at the ZLB. When the degree of price sticki-
ness in the periphery is assumed to be higher than in the core, the
internal devaluation channel is reversed, making the consolidation
harder to achieve. Third, looking at the role of the public good in
the economy, we find that consolidation in a low-inflation environ-
ment is more difficult if the public good is productive, such that the
cut in public-sector output has an effect on the marginal product
of private labor. Finally, concerning parameters related to the open-
ness of the periphery, we show that lower elasticity of substitution
between home-produced and imported goods makes consolidation
harder to achieve, whereas a bigger size of the block implementing
the consolidation implies that it becomes less costly.
Our work is related to a few recent articles. On the empirical
side, our results are consistent with the recent findings of Pe´rez
et al. (2016), who show that while government wage and employ-
ment reforms have adverse short-term effects, such measures can
yield medium- to long-term benefits due to possible competitive-
ness gains, through spillover effects on private-sector wages, and
efficiency gains, through their impact on labor market dynamics.
Another related paper is the empirical work of Lamo, Moral-Benito,
and Pe´rez (2016), who find that the contractionary effects of employ-
ment cuts appear more damaging for the Spanish economy than
those of wage cuts. Using U.S. data, Bermperoglu, Pappa, and Vella
(2017) find that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary
at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local
level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force
participation and private-sector employment. Similarly, state and
local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and
output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant
contractionary effects.
On the theoretical side, the literature has also investigated the
impact of shocks in the public sector on the level and volatility of
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employment and wages (see, e.g., Quadrini and Trigari 2007 and
Gomes 2015). Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2016) estimate
a structural model with a public sector and a labor market with
search-and-matching frictions, using U.K. data. The authors run
simulations of austerity measures, such as a reduction in public-
sector hiring, an increase in public-sector layoffs, and progressive
and proportional cuts to the distribution of wages in the public sec-
tor, that were implemented after the 2008 recession. In line with
our results away from the ZLB, they find that all policies increase
hiring and turnover in the private sector. In an earlier contribu-
tion, Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) developed a simple two-sector
model of the labor market with endogenous unemployment, but
without explicit dynamics, showing that increases in government
wages lead to increases in private-sector wages and higher unem-
ployment, while increases in government employment do not have
a significant impact on unemployment. Similarly, Ardagna (2007)
has shown that, in a DSGE model with a unionized labor mar-
ket, unions demand higher wages in response to a debt-financed
increase in public-sector employment and wages, which leads to a
fall in private-sector employment and a contraction in the economy.
We extend the existing literature by considering a DSGE model of
a monetary union and by explicitly incorporating the ZLB and ana-
lyzing its consequences for the effects of cuts in the public wage
bill.6
The remainder of the paper is organized follows. In section 2,
we provide the details of the model. Section 3 discusses the results
of the different policy experiments, and section 4 provides extensive
sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a DSGE model of a two-block monetary union with
search-and-matching frictions, endogenous labor force participation,
6A link can also be established with the two-country model of a currency
union in Kuvshinov, Mu¨ller, and Wolf (2016). The authors look at a deleveraging
shock taking place in the periphery and find that deleveraging generates defla-
tionary spillovers which cannot be contained by monetary policy, as it becomes
constrained by the zero lower bound.
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and sticky prices in the short run. The two countries, labeled “home”
and “foreign,” are of sizes n and 1 − n, respectively. The following
subsections describe the home economy in more detail: the struc-
ture of the foreign economy is analogous. All variables are in per
capita terms. Where necessary, the conventional  denotes foreign
variables or parameters, and the subscripts h and f denote goods
produced in the home and foreign economy and their respective
prices.
There are four types of firms in each block: (i) a government-
owned firm that produces the public good, (ii) private competitive
firms that use labor and effective capital to produce a non-tradable
intermediate good, (iii) monopolistic retailers that transform the
intermediate good into a tradable good, and (iv) competitive final
goods producers that use domestic- and foreign-produced retail
goods to produce a final, non-tradable good that is used for invest-
ment and consumption. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while
labor market frictions occur in the intermediate goods sector. The
representative household consists of private and public employees,
unemployed, and labor force non-participants. The government col-
lects taxes and issues debt to finance the wages of public employ-
ees, the cost of opening new vacancies in the public sector, and the
provision of unemployment benefits.
2.1 Labor Markets
We consider search-and-matching frictions in both the private and
public labor markets. In each period, jobs in each sector, j = p, g,
are destroyed at a constant fraction σj and a measure mj of new
matches are formed. The evolution of employment in each sector is
thus given by
njt+1 = (1 − σj)njt + mjt . (1)
We assume that σp > σg in order to capture the fact that, in general,
public employment is more permanent than private employment.7
7For example, Albrecht, Robayo-Abril, and Vroman (2015) and Gomes (2015)
find empirical evidence that separation rates in the public sector are lower than
those in the private sector in the United Kingdom, United States, and Colombia,
respectively.
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The new matches are given by
mjt = μ¯
j(υjt )
μ(ujt)
1−μ, (2)
where υ and u are vacancies and jobseekers, respectively, and the
matching efficiency, μ¯j , can differ in the two sectors. From the
matching functions specified above we can define, for each sector
j, the probability of a jobseeker being hired, ψhjt , and of a vacancy
being filled, ψfjt :
ψhjt ≡
mjt
ujt
(3)
ψfjt ≡
mjt
υjt
. (4)
2.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely
lived agents. The members of the household derive utility from
leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members that are out of
the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, ct. Lifetime utility of
the representative household is defined as
∑∞
t=0 β
tβt U(ct, lt), where
the instantaneous utility function is given by
U(ct, lt) =
(ct − ζct−1)1−η
1 − η +Φ
l1−ϕt
1 − ϕ, (5)
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
ζ is the parameter determining habits in consumption, Φ > 0 is the
relative preference for leisure, ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elastic-
ity of labor supply, β is the discount factor, and βt is a demand
shock.
At any point in time, a fraction npt (n
g
t ) of the household mem-
bers are private (public) employees. Bruckner and Pappa (2012) and
Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) have added a labor force participa-
tion choice in New Keynesian models of equilibrium unemployment.
Following Ravn (2008), the participation choice is modeled as a
tradeoff between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of
finding a job. In particular, the household chooses the fraction of
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the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the fraction
that are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt. Normalizing
the size of the household to 1, the composition of the household is
given by
npt + n
g
t + ut + lt = 1. (6)
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in
each sector: a share st of jobseekers look for a job in the public
sector, while the remainder, (1−st), seek employment in the private
sector. That is, ugt ≡ stut and upt ≡ (1 − st)ut.
The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves
according to
kpt+1 = 
i
t
[
1 − ω
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it + (1 − δ(xt)) kpt , (7)
where it is private investment, it is a shock to the marginal efficiency
of investment, and ω dictates the size of investment adjustment
costs. Following Neiss and Pappa (2005), the depreciation rate, δ(xt),
will depend on the degree of capital utilization, xt, according to
δ(xt) = δ¯x
ξ
t , (8)
where δ¯ and ξ are positive constants.
The budget constraint, in real terms, is given by
(1 + τ c) ct + it + bg,t+1 + etrf,t−1bf,t
≤ [rkt − τk (rkt − δ(xt))]xtkpt + rt−1bg,t + etbf,t+1
+ (1 − τnt ) (wpt npt + wgt ngt ) + but +Πpt + Tt, (9)
where wjt , j = g, p, are the real wages in the two sectors; rkt is the
real return on effective capital; b denotes unemployment benefits;
Πpt are the profits of the monopolistic retailers, discussed below; and
τ c, τk, τnt , and Tt represent taxes on private consumption, private
capital, labor income, and lump-sum transfers, respectively. Gov-
ernment bonds are denoted by bg,t, and pay the real return rt−1,
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while bf,t denote liabilities with the foreign country.8 Although the
nominal exchange rate is fixed, the interest rate on foreign assets,
rf,t, is still affected by consumer price inflation differentials between
the two countries, which are captured by the real exchange rate, et.
In fact, we can define the gross nominal interest rate at home, Rt,
through the Fisher equation:
rt =
Rt
Etπt+1
, (10)
where πt is the gross consumer price inflation rate.
The problem of the household is to choose ct, ut, st, n
p
t+1, n
g
t+1,
it, k
p
t+1, xt, bg,t+1, and bf,t+1 to maximize lifetime utility subject to
the budget constraint, (9); the law of motion of employment in each
sector, (1), taking the probability of finding a job as given; the law
of motion of capital, (7); the definition of capital depreciation, (8);
and the composition of the household, (6). The resulting first-order
conditions are provided in an online appendix.9
We can derive the marginal value of an additional private-sector
employee as
V Hnpt = λctw
p
t (1 − τnt ) − Φl−ϕt + (1 − σp)βEt(V Hnpt+1), (11)
where λct is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Using
(11) together with the equivalent expression for the value of an addi-
tional public-sector employee, the definition of hiring rates, (3), and
the first-order condition with respect to st, we obtain
Et
(
V Hng,t+1
)
ψhgt = Et
(
V Hnp,t+1
)
ψhpt . (12)
This equation shows that, in equilibrium, the expected value of
searching in the two sectors is equalized. This expected value will
depend not only on the probability of finding a job in each sec-
tor, ψhjt , but also on the expected utility from having an additional
8Assuming that government debt is only held by local households captures
well the case of periphery countries like Italy and Spain, where the largest frac-
tion of public debt is held domestically. An interesting extension would be to
allow for public debt to also be held externally.
9The online appendix can be found at https://me.eui.eu/evi-pappa/.
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worker in each sector, which, in turn, will depend on the respec-
tive wage in each sector and the separation rate, σj . This means
that a wage differential can arise between the two sectors in a
non-degenerate equilibrium if there are differences in the number
of vacancies, the matching efficiency, or the separation rate.
2.3 Production
2.3.1 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
ypt = (n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ, (13)
where kpt and n
p
t are private capital and labor inputs, and xt is the
degree of capital utilization.10
Since current hires give future value to intermediate firms, the
optimization problem is dynamic and, hence, firms maximize the
discounted value of future profits. The number of workers currently
employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment decision con-
cerns the number of vacancies posted in the current period, υpt , so as
to employ the desired number of workers next period, npt+1. Firms
also decide the amount of the private capital, kpt , to be rented from
the household at rate rkt . The problem of an intermediate firm with
npt workers currently employed can be written as
Qp(npt ) = max
kpt ,υ
p
t
{
px,t(n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ − wpt npt
− rkt xtkpt − κυpt + Et
[
Λt,t+1Qp(n
p
t+1)
] }
, (14)
where px,t is the relative price of intermediate goods, κ is a util-
ity cost associated with posting a new vacancy, and Λt,t+1 is the
household’s stochastic discount factor. The maximization takes place
subject to the private employment transition equation, where the
10The assumption of variable capital utilization here is important: note that,
without it, all factors of production would be predetermined, meaning that out-
put cannot adjust on impact in response to shocks. In this case, the nominal
interest rate needs to adjust sharply to bring the economy to equilibrium. To
illustrate this, we present, in the appendix, the results of our model without
variable capital utilization away from the ZLB.
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firm takes the probability of the vacancy being filled as given. The
first-order conditions with respect to capital and vacancies are
px,tφ
ypt
xtk
p
t
= rkt (15)
κ
ψfpt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
px,t+1(1 − φ)
ypt+1
npt+1
− wpt+1 + (1 − σp)
κ
ψfpt+1
]
. (16)
According to (15) and (16), the value of the marginal product of pri-
vate capital should equal the real rental rate and the marginal cost
of hiring an additional worker should equal the expected marginal
benefit. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labor minus
the wage plus the continuation value, knowing that with probability
σp the match can be destroyed.
The marginal value, for the firm, of an additional employee is
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp(npt )
∂npt
= px,t(1 − φ)y
p
t
npt
− wpt +
(1 − σp)κ
ψfpt
. (17)
2.3.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers
indexed by i on the unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods
and differentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit
of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and, thus, the
relative price of intermediate goods, px,t, coincides with the real mar-
ginal cost faced by the retailers. Let yi,t be the quantity of output
produced by retailer i. These goods are aggregated into a tradable
good, which is given by
yrt =
[∫ 1
0
(yi,t)
−1
 di
] 
−1
,
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for each vari-
ety of retail goods. The aggregate tradable good is sold at a price
Ph,t =
( ∫
(Pi,h,t)
−1
di
) 1
−1 , where Pi,h,t is the price of each variety
i. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative
price and on aggregate demand:
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yi,t =
(
Pi,h,t
Ph,t
)−
yrt . (18)
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each
retailer can reset its price with a fixed probability (1 − χ). Firms that
are able to reset their nominal price choose P ∗i,h,t so as to maximize
expected real profits given by
Πt (i) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βχ)s Λt,t+s
([
Pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,t+s
)
subject to the demand schedule, (18), in each period. Since all firms
are ex ante identical, P ∗i,h,t = P
∗
h,t for all i. The resulting expression
for the real price p∗h,t ≡ P ∗h,t/Pt is
p∗h,t
ph,t
=

( − 1)
Nt
Dt , (19)
where
Nt = px,tyrt + βχEtΛt,t+1 (πh,t+1) Nt+1 (20)
Dt = ph,tyrt + βχEtΛt,t+1 (πh,t+1)−1 Dt+1. (21)
ph,t ≡ Ph,t/Pt and πh,t denotes producer price inflation. Under the
assumption of Calvo pricing, the price index, in nominal terms, is
given by
(Ph,t)1− = χ (Ph,t−1)
1− + (1 − χ) (P ∗h,t)1− . (22)
The aggregate tradable good is sold domestically and abroad:
yrt = yh,t + y
	
h,t, (23)
where yh,t is the quantity of tradable goods sold domestically and
y	h,t the quantity sold abroad, and we have assumed that the law of
one price holds:
ph,t = etp	h,t. (24)
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2.3.3 Final Goods Producer
Finally, in each block, perfectly competitive firms produce a non-
tradable final good by aggregating domestic and foreign aggre-
gate retail goods using constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
technology:
yt =
[
()
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1 − ) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
,
where τ ≡ (1 − n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods at
home to per capita terms. The home bias parameter, , denotes the
fraction of the final good that is produced at home. The elasticity of
substitution between home-produced and imported goods is given
by γ. Final good producers maximize profits yt − ph,tyh,t − pf,tτyf,t
each period. Solving for the optimal demand functions gives
yh,t =  (ph,t)
−γ
yt (25)
yf,t = (1 − ) (pf,t)−γ 1
τ
yt. (26)
The consumer price index, Pt, is defined by substituting out yh,t
and yf,t in the CES above by the respective demand curves, which
yields
P 1−γt =  (Ph,t)
1−γ + (1 − ) (Pf,t)1−γ . (27)
2.4 Government
The government sector produces a public good using public capital
and labor:
ygt = (n
g
t )
1−α(k¯g)α, (28)
where α is the share of public capital, k¯g, which is assumed to be
fixed. In our baseline exercises below, we assume that ygt does not
increase the productivity of the private sector, whereas in section
4.3 we also consider the case in which public production is used
to increase private productivity. Government expenditure consists
of public wages, public vacancy costs, unemployment benefits, con-
sumption expenditure, and lump-sum transfers, while revenues come
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from the consumption, capital income, and labor income taxes.11
The government deficit is, therefore, defined by
DFt = w
g
t n
g
t + κv
g
t + but + gt + Tt − τnt (wpt npt + wgt ngt )
− τk(rkt − δt)xtkpt − τ cct,
and the government budget constraint is given by
bg,t + DFt =
bg,t+1
rt
. (29)
When considering public wage bill cuts, the government has two
potential fiscal instruments, υg and wg. For comparison, we will also
consider consolidation through traditional fiscal instruments; labor
income tax rates, τn; and government consumption expenditure, g.
The other tax rates, τk and τ c, will be treated as parameters and
not considered as potential instruments. We consider each instru-
ment separately, assuming that if one is active, the other remains
fixed at its steady-state value. For Ψ ∈ {υg, wg, g, τn}, following
Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and Pappa, Sajedi, and Vella (2015), we
assume fiscal rules of the form
Ψt = Ψ(1−βΨ0) Ψ
βΨ0
t−1
⎡
⎣
(
b˜g,t
b∗g,t
)βΨ1 (
Δb˜g,t+1
Δb∗g,t+1
)βΨ2⎤⎦
(1−βΨ0)
, (30)
where b˜g,t ≡ bg,trgdpt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and b∗g,t is the target
debt-to-GDP ratio, given by the AR(2) process:
log b∗g,t − log b∗g,t−1 = ρ2logb¯ + ρ1(log b∗g,t−1 − log b∗g,t−2)
− ρ2 log b∗g,t−1 − εbt , (31)
where b¯ is the steady-state debt-to-GDP level and εbt is a white-noise
process representing a fiscal consolidation shock.
11Note that although the two types of public expenditure are wasteful, they
have different functions in the economy. While gt represents purchases of final
goods produced by the private sector, producing ygt requires the payment of wages
to the household, keeping workers out of productive work.
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2.5 Closing the Model
2.5.1 Monetary Policy
There is a single independent monetary authority that sets the gross
nominal interest rate to target zero net inflation, subject to the ZLB:
R	t = Max
{
1, ρRR	t−1 + (1 − ρR) ρππ˜t
}
, (32)
where π˜t = nπt +(1 − n)π	t . For the home economy, consumer price
inflation is defined as
πt =
Pt
Pt−1
. (33)
With fixed nominal exchange rates, the real exchange rate equals
the ratio of consumer prices:
et =
P 	t
Pt
. (34)
2.5.2 Resource Constraint
The non-tradable domestic final good is sold for private and public
consumption and for investment, and is also used for the costs of
vacancy postings:
yt = ct + it + gt + κ(υ
p
t + υ
g
t ). (35)
In turn, following the national accounting identity, total output is
defined as tradable output plus the government wage bill:
rgdpt = ph,tyrt + w
g
t n
g
t . (36)
Aggregating the budget constraint of households using the mar-
ket clearing conditions, the budget constraint of the government,
and aggregate profits, we obtain the law of motion for net foreign
assets, which is given by
et (rf,t−1bf,t − bf,t+1) = nxt (37)
and where nxt are net exports defined as
nxt = ph,ty	h,t − pf,tτyf,t. (38)
Vol. 14 No. 3 Fiscal Consolidation in a Low-Inflation Environment 25
Finally, we introduce a risk premium charged to home house-
holds depending on the relative size of net foreign liabilities to real
GDP:
rf,t = r	t exp
{
Γet
bf,t+1
rgdpt
}
, (39)
where Γ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to the
liabilities.
2.5.3 Wage Bargaining
Private-sector wages are determined by ex post (after matching)
Nash bargaining. Workers and firms split rents, and the part of the
surplus they receive depends on their bargaining power. Denoting by
ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining power, the Nash bargaining problem
is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt
{
(1 − ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV Fnpt
}
,
where V Hnpt and V
F
npt are given by (11) and (17), respectively. The
optimization problem leads to the following solution for wpt :
wpt = (1 − ϑ)px,t(1 − φ)
ypt
npt
+
ϑ
(1 − τnt )λc,t
Φl−ϕt . (40)
Hence, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the mar-
ginal product of employment and the disutility from labor, with
the weights given by the firm and household’s bargaining power,
respectively.
2.6 Model Solution and Calibration
We solve the model by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around
a non-stochastic steady state in which all prices are flexible, the price
of the private good is normalized to unity, and inflation is zero. To
account for the ZLB, which is a non-linear constraint, we use the
OccBin toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). Follow-
ing the literature, the low-inflation environment is induced by assum-
ing a shock to the household’s discount rate, βt , in both countries.
An unexpected fall in βt translates to a fall in the relative weight on
26 International Journal of Central Banking June 2018
today’s consumption relative to future consumption, therefore push-
ing the stochastic discount factor up. Hence, this shock contracts
demand and causes inflation to fall across the monetary union, dri-
ving the common nominal interest rate to its lower bound. By raising
the household’s propensity to save, the discount factor shock by itself
induces a rise in investment. To avoid this counterfactual behavior
for investment, we also introduce a shock to the price of investment,
it, that leads to a fall in investment.
12
The stochastic processes for these fluctuations are as follows:
βt = (1 − ρβ)β + ρββt−1 + βt
it = (1 − ρi)i + ρiit−1 + it,
where we set ρβ = 0.6 and ρi = 0.85.
Table 1 shows the key parameters and steady-state values tar-
geted in our calibration. We calibrate the model at a quarterly
frequency and consider the home economy to represent the periph-
ery of the euro area, consisting of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. We follow Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and assume symme-
try across the two blocks for most parameters. However, because
we set n = 0.3 and assume zero net foreign assets in the steady
state, the two blocks necessarily differ in the degree of home bias,
 and 	, which is set to 0.85 in the periphery and 0.94 in the
core. Again following Erceg and Linde´ (2013), we set the elasticity
between domestic and foreign consumption goods to 1.5, and set
private output, yp, to represent 77 percent of GDP.
We choose an annual government debt-to-GDP ratio of 80 per-
cent, significantly above the Maastricht limit and, therefore, consis-
tent with an environment in which fiscal consolidation is deemed
necessary. We set the share of government consumption to GDP
equal to the average share of government intermediate consumption
to GDP in the European periphery. We set the steady-state labor
income tax rate at 30 percent, and set government consumption
expenditure at 80 percent of the public wage bill, in line with the
euro-area average.
12Responses for the low-inflation environment without the investment shock are
shown in the online appendix. The responses of variables other than investment
are not qualitatively affected by this shock.
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Table 1. Calibration of Parameters and
Steady-State Values
Parameter/
Variable Value Description
Preferences
β 0.99 Discount Factor
η 1.00 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
ζ 0.70 Habits in Consumption
ϕ 4.00 Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply
 0.85 Home Bias in the Periphery
γ 1.50 Elasticity of Substitution between Home
and Foreign Goods
Ratios
n 30% Relative Size of Periphery
yp/rgdp 77% Private Output to GDP
Bg/rgdp 80% Annual Public Debt to GDP
g/rgdp 8.3% Government Consumption to GDP
Labor Market
(1 − l) 65% Labor Force Participation
u/(1 − l) 12% Unemployment Rate
ug/u 20% Share of Jobseekers in the Public Sector
ng/n 18% Share of Public Employment
b/(1 − τn)wp 52.3% Net Replacement Rate
κ/wp 7.29% Vacancy Costs as a Share of Wages
ψfp, ψfg 7% Probability of Vacancy Filling (Private,
Public)
σp 4.18% Private Job Destruction Rate
σg 0.95×σp Public Job Destruction Rate
μ 0.50 Elasticity of Matching wrt Vacancies
Production
ω 7.3 Investment Adjustment Costs
ξ 2.15 Elasticity of Depreciation to Changes in
Utilization
δ¯ 2% Depreciation Rate
φ, α 36% Capital Share (Private, Public)
 1.1 Markup
χ 0.75 Calvo Lottery
Policy
ρR 0.85 Interest Rate Inertia
ρπ 1.50 Taylor-Rule Inflation Targeting
ρ1, ρ2 0.79, 0.0001 Persistence Debt Target
βv0 , βv1 , βv2 0.6, 3.4, 3 Fiscal Rule Parameters for Vacancy Cuts
βw0 , βw1 , βw2 0.85, 0.45, 0.3 Fiscal Rule Parameters for Wage Cuts
Note: Unless otherwise stated, parameter values are equal for both countries.
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The rest of the utility function parameters are standard. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 1 and the habit
parameter is set equal to 0.6 in order to increase persistence and
the duration of the lower bound. We assume a Frisch elasticity of
labor supply equal to 0.25.
We set the labor force participation rate to 65 percent; we assume
that 20 percent of jobseekers are searching in the public sector
and that 18 percent of employed workers are working for the gov-
ernment.13 For the remaining labor market parameters, we follow
Moyen, Sta¨hler, and Winkler (2016), who calibrate a model for the
euro area with one block matching the periphery. As such, the unem-
ployment rate is set to 12 percent, the net replacement rate to equal
52.3 percent, and vacancy posting costs to represent 7.29 percent of
private wages. We assume equal probabilities of a vacancy to be filled
in both sectors, ψfp = ψfg = 7%. As discussed above, we assume
that the average duration of employment is shorter in the private
sector, and therefore set the separation rate in the public sector 5
percent lower than in the private sector.
The parameters in the production function are standard: the cap-
ital share is set to 0.36 in both sectors. The depreciation rate implies
an annual depreciation of 10 percent, and the investment adjust-
ment costs are set equal to 7.3.14 We set the elasticity of capital
depreciation to capital utilization, ξ, such that capital utilization
is 1 at steady state. Finally, we assume that prices are sticky for
four quarters and that the central bank reacts only to deviations of
inflation.
For the parameters governing fiscal policy, we set ρ1 and ρ2,
which govern the path of the debt-to-GDP target, such that any
change in the target is observed fully after thirty quarters and
lasts for an arbitrarily long period of time, beyond the relevant
13Under our preferred calibration, we obtain a public wage premium over the
private wage of slightly above 1 percent. If we assume instead that 26 percent of
jobseekers are searching in the public sector, we obtain a premium of 5 percent:
employment conditions relatively more attractive in the public sector justify the
increase in jobseekers searching for a public job. Our results, presented in the
online appendix, do not change significantly in the presence of a higher public
wage premium.
14We have investigated the sensitivity of our results to changes in this param-
eter. Lower values of ω imply a higher initial drop in investment after the shock
to its price and make consolidation tougher for both instruments.
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policy horizon.15 Finally, we set the parameters governing the fis-
cal instruments in equation (30) such that, in normal times, the
actual debt-to-GDP ratio meets the target after thirty quarters for
both instruments.
3. Fiscal Consolidation through the Wage Bill
We consider a shock that drives the debt-to-GDP target 10 percent
below its steady state. We simulate the responses to this shock with
either public vacancies, υg, or public wages, wg, adjusting to achieve
fiscal consolidation, and compare the effects of the consolidation
under these two instruments and under two alternative instruments,
namely public consumption spending, gt, and the labor income tax
rate, τnt , for the sake of comparison with the existing literature.
We first look at the effects of this shock in normal times and then
compare these results to when the consolidation is implemented in
a low-inflation environment.
3.1 Consolidation in Normal Times
Figure 3 presents the comparison between cutting public vacan-
cies and cutting public wages to meet the new debt-to-GDP target,
when the economy is not subject to the demand shocks.For both
instruments, the consolidation induces a gradual fall in the public
wage bill and a contraction in public employment and, hence, public
output. In the case of public vacancies, the reduction in the public
wage bill has a slight lag relative to the wage cuts, due to the lag
in the adjustment of public employment. Crucially, for both instru-
ments, the share of public-sector jobseekers in total jobseekers falls.
In the case of public vacancy cuts, there is a fall in the number of
matches and hence the probability of finding a job in the public sec-
tor. The public wage cuts cause the value of the public-sector job, in
the case of a match, to fall. As a result, in both cases, the expected
value of searching for a job in the public sector is reduced. Since
15All shocks considered in the exercises below are temporary, including the
shock that induces the fall in the debt-to-GDP target. However, we calibrate the
target rule (31) such that the debt-to-GDP target returns to its steady state at
a slow pace.
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Figure 3. Normal Times: Comparison
of Fiscal Instruments
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are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panel reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
agents redirect their search until the expected value of searching
in each sector is equalized, this leads to a reallocation of jobseekers
towards the private sector.16 With public wages as the active instru-
ment, this mechanism induces an endogenous reduction in public
employment, which further aids the consolidation. In contrast, pub-
lic vacancies need to adjust a lot more to achieve a similar fall in
the public wage bill, since in this case public wages are assumed to
be fixed.
The reduction in expenditure on the public wage bill creates a
positive wealth effect for the household, which leads to falling labor
16Note that, in equilibrium, the expected value of searching for a job will be
lower in both sectors.
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force participation and hence lower labor supply. In the short run,
this raises private wages. Nonetheless, the increase in the supply
of labor in the private sector, due to the reallocation of jobseekers,
eventually pushes down on private wages. Hence, by increasing the
competitiveness of the periphery within the monetary union, consol-
idation induces an internal devaluation and so implies a depreciation
of the real exchange rate and eventually a rise in net exports.
The rise in demand for the private good and the fall in pri-
vate wages also imply a rise in private vacancies. The expansion of
both the demand and supply of private labor raises private employ-
ment. As the labor markets adjust, the faster response of private
employment in the case of public wage cuts means that more job-
seekers are absorbed into private employment, and unemployment
continues to fall. On the other hand, in the case of vacancy cuts,
the sluggish response of the private-sector labor market means that
fewer jobseekers are hired. Along with the fact that public employ-
ment falls by much more in the medium to long run, this implies
that the unemployment rate falls less noticeably when vacancy cuts
are the active instrument.17
Recalling the definition of GDP as the sum of private and public
output, with the latter measured by the public wage bill, we can
see that the consolidation process initially boosts GDP following
the increase in private-sector output, but then depresses GDP for
many periods, given the fall in the public wage bill. In the short to
medium run, this effect is somewhat bigger for wage cuts, given the
larger increase in tradable output. The long-run effect on tradable
output is higher for vacancy cuts, which mitigates the fall in real
GDP relative to public wage cuts.
Although our model differs substantially from that of Bradley,
Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2016), we also find that in normal times
cuts in the public wage bill expand the private sector, both by
raising demand and by causing a reallocation of jobseekers to the
private sector. We have also underlined an additional mechanism
17The responses of total employment are presented in the online appendix.
For all fiscal instruments considered, except for public wage cuts, total employ-
ment falls with consolidation in normal times. For the case of vacancy cuts, the
smaller crowding in of private employment and the bigger reduction in public
employment brings total employment down. For the case of wage cuts, public
employment falls by less, while private employment is increased more.
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not considered in Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2016), namely
that for both instruments the public wage bill cut in a monetary
union induces an internal devaluation, therefore aiding the recovery
by raising external demand. Comparing the two instruments, cut-
ting public wages implies a faster expansion in the private sector
and hence a larger fall in unemployment. Public vacancy cuts, on
the other hand, imply an overall larger cut in public employment
and a significantly more sluggish response of workers, such that the
positive effects in the private sector take longer to materialize.
To gain some more insight about the nature of the consolida-
tion we consider relative to the existing literature, we also plot in
figure 3 the responses of the economy when debt consolidation is
achieved through the traditional fiscal instruments, namely waste-
ful public consumption spending and labor income taxes. With both
wages and vacancies in the public sector kept fixed, these alternative
instruments do not affect public employment or the allocation of job-
seekers in the two sectors. In the case of government spending cuts,
there is a positive wealth effect that leads to an increase in pri-
vate consumption and a fall in labor force participation, as in the
case of public wage bill cuts. The exit of jobseekers from the labor
force also lowers the unemployment rate. This inward shift in labor
supply induces an increase in real wages and firms’ marginal costs
which, together with the fall in spending, induces labor demand, and
therefore private vacancies, to fall. Coupled with the fact that unem-
ployed jobseekers do not switch sectors, this induces a fall in private
employment and hence in tradable output and real GDP. As is stan-
dard in the existing literature, and in contrast to cuts to the public
wage bill, government spending multipliers are found to be positive.
The rise in the labor tax rate also lowers labor force partici-
pation substantially, by directly reducing the incentives to work.
Since consumption also falls in this case, given the drop in after-tax
income, this leads to a bigger drop in private vacancies, and hence
larger negative effects on private employment and tradable output.
Responses are significantly larger and more persistent than in the
case of consumption spending cuts, due to a fall in investment. Fur-
thermore, the rise in labor taxes increases unemployment after the
short run and reduces the competitiveness of the periphery, leading
to a real exchange rate appreciation, unlike all of the spending-based
consolidations.
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Figure 4. Normal Times vs. Low-Inflation
Environment: Public Vacancy Cuts
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Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panel reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
3.2 Consolidation in a Low-Inflation Environment
We now turn to the case where the consolidation occurs while mon-
etary policy is constrained at the ZLB and inflation is stuck below
steady state. Figures 4 and 5 plot the impulse response functions for
vacancy cuts and wage cuts, respectively. In each figure, to aid com-
parison, we again plot the baseline consolidation in normal times in
the blue solid lines, as in figure 3.
For completeness, we also plot the case where the economy
is hit by the negative demand shocks but the ZLB constraint is
not imposed: these are the green dashed lines. In both figures,
in this unconstrained case the net nominal interest rate becomes
negative for around five quarters. This depresses the real interest
34 International Journal of Central Banking June 2018
Figure 5. Normal Times vs. Low-Inflation
Environment: Public Wage Cuts
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Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panel reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
rate, offsetting the effects of the negative demand shocks through
a smaller fall in private consumption and investment. It is interest-
ing to note that the fall in the real interest rate is actually a boost
to public finances, and the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio quickly
falls close to the target with only a smaller adjustment in the fiscal
instruments needed.
Conversely, when the ZLB is imposed, shown by the red dash-
dotted lines, the nominal rate remains at its lower bound for around
five quarters: the real interest rate is higher than the unconstrained
case and inflation falls by more. The contraction of tradable output,
coupled with the fall in inflation, pushes the government’s debt-to-
GDP ratio in an upward trajectory, in spite of the consolidation.
Hence, a much larger adjustment of the fiscal instrument is needed
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in this environment, and in fact the target is not fully reached after
thirty quarters.
At the ZLB, with both consumption and investment contracting,
private vacancies fall sharply and the private sector is no longer able
to absorb the increasing number of private jobseekers. In fact, the
share of jobseekers in the public sector rises on impact in the case
of cuts in public vacancies. As a result, in the short run, private
employment falls and the unemployment rate rises, in line with the
recent experience of countries in the periphery of the euro area. As
the consolidation in the public sector deepens, in the medium to
long run, we again see a shift of jobseekers to the private sector, a
rise in private vacancies, and a rise in private employment. Tradable
output follows a similar path, contracting in the short to medium
run but rising above steady state in the long run. Real GDP also
falls sharply during the liquidity trap and remains persistently below
steady state due to the larger fall in the public wage bill.
What does the low-inflation environment imply about the com-
parison of fiscal instruments? In figure 6 we plot together the
responses for the different instruments when the ZLB constraint is
binding. Compared to figure 3, we see that the responses for cuts in
public vacancies and cuts in public wages are now relatively closer
in general, and, particularly, for tradable output and real GDP. This
comes about because the relatively larger size of the demand shocks
dominates the shape of most responses. The most striking difference
is in unemployment: after the impact period, the unemployment rate
falls substantially in the case of wage cuts, while it remains elevated
in the case of vacancy cuts. This difference stems mainly from the
weaker performance of private employment and the larger fall in
public employment. Hence, in terms of the response of unemploy-
ment and the private-sector employment, the effects of public wage
cuts are less adverse than those of vacancy cuts in a low-inflation
environment.18
18In the online appendix we show that at the zero lower bound total employ-
ment increases in the medium run in the case of public wage cuts and falls in the
case of vacancy cuts. Also, in exercises we do not show here for economy of space,
we find that the increase in unemployment following vacancy cuts can be miti-
gated by assuming a lower Frisch elasticity. Nonetheless, these results are robust
for reasonable values, 0.1 ≤ 1
ϕ
≤ 1, and do not affect our conclusions regarding
the effects of wage cuts versus vacancy cuts for reducing the unemployment rate.
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Figure 6. Low-Inflation Environment:
Comparison of Fiscal Instruments
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Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panel reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
Again, in figure 6 we compare consolidation in the public wage
bill with consolidations through standard cuts in government con-
sumption or tax hikes. As we have seen above, when the consol-
idation is implemented at the ZLB, the fall in demand causes a
contraction in the private sector, pushing down on both private-
sector wages and vacancies. When wages and vacancies in the public
sector do not adjust, this increases the incentives of jobseekers to
search in the public sector, and we see a sizable reallocation of labor
towards the public sector. This leads to a large and persistent fall
in both private employment and tradable output with the tradi-
tional fiscal instruments. Hence, in a low-inflation environment, the
contraction in the public sector through cuts in public vacancies or
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public wages helps the economy recover in the medium run, while
traditional consolidation instruments do not.
3.3 The Role of the Consolidation Shock
Since we are considering simultaneous shocks, it is useful to sep-
arate their effects. To this end, we now compare the responses of
the economy at the ZLB, as discussed above, to a case where the
economy hits the ZLB but the public debt target is held constant.
The comparison is shown in figures 7A and 7B for vacancy cuts and
wage cuts, respectively, with the blue solid lines reporting the sce-
nario with the consolidation shock and the green dashed lines the
one without.
For both policy instruments, consolidation is, in fact, induced by
the negative demand shocks alone. As discussed above, by induc-
ing a fall in inflation and a contraction in the private sector, the
demand shocks increase the debt-to-GDP ratio above the target. As
a result, and according to the fiscal rule specified in equation (30),
public vacancies or wages are automatically cut, even without the
fall in the debt-to-GDP target. Nonetheless, these cuts are smaller
compared to the scenario with the consolidation shock. Importantly,
this means that there is a smaller reallocation of jobseekers to the
private sector after the initial impact of the negative demand shocks.
Due to the drop in private demand, now households initially reallo-
cate jobseekers towards the public sector for both instruments. This
leads to a smaller depreciation of the real exchange rate and a bigger
fall in private consumption. The fall in investment is also noticeably
larger. The response of private employment now becomes persis-
tently negative. Along with the implied smaller drop in labor force
participation, this means that, for both instruments, the unemploy-
ment rate is higher without the consolidation shock, too. Hence, we
conclude that at the ZLB the consolidation shock aids the recovery
of the economy.
4. Sensitivity Analysis
We now perform different exercises to investigate how the mecha-
nisms of the model affect our results at the ZLB. First, we explore
the role of labor market rigidities, by assuming that the household
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Figure 7. The Role of Consolidation
at the Zero Lower Bound
A.
B.
Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The lines with diamond markers on the top-left panels report the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
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cannot reallocate jobseekers between the two sectors.19 Second, we
investigate the importance of price rigidities for the effects of fiscal
consolidation. Third, we consider the alternative scenario in which
the public good is used in private production. Finally, we test the
sensitivity of our results with regards to the parameters that deter-
mine the openness of the economy.
4.1 Fixed Allocation of Jobseekers
Our analysis has highlighted the role of the labor market channels
in driving the effects of fiscal consolidation through public wage
bill cuts. We now explore the extent to which muting the real-
location of unemployed jobseekers between the two sectors affects
our findings. Letting households choose the fraction of unemployed
workers that look for a job in each of the two sectors is impor-
tant for the dynamics of our model. This assumption implies that
jobseekers can costlessly optimize their search between sectors in
each period. However, in reality, human capital derived from learned
skills, past experience, and in-job networking introduce an asym-
metry to the mobility of workers. Hence jobseekers with previous
experience in one sector would find it more difficult to be hired in
the other. To explore the consequences of imperfect mobility, we
impose that the fraction of jobseekers in the public sector, st, is
held fixed at steady state. Hence, although the number of workers
employed in each sector can evolve separately through the dynamics
of vacancy postings, matches, and labor force participation, house-
holds cannot freely decide to reallocate jobseekers to one particular
sector.
The green dashed lines in figures 8A and 8B depict the responses
under this scenario. With no reallocation of jobseekers to the pri-
vate sector, the recovery is now much slower. Firstly, as debt-to-GDP
falls more slowly after the liquidity trap, larger and more persistent
cuts in public vacancies and wages are needed for consolidation. In
fact, the target now takes significantly longer to be met. Output
19We have also investigated the effects of wage rigidity in the private sector,
assuming that private real wages evolve as in Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari
(2010). These results are available in the online appendix. In line with Krause
and Lubik (2007), sticky wages do not seem to substantially affect any of our
previous conclusions.
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Figure 8. Labor Market Rigidities
at the Zero Lower Bound
A.
B.
Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panels reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
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and unemployment effects become more adverse. This mechanism
is particularly important for wage cuts, where, without the rise of
jobseekers in the private sector, private employment now does not
increase. Nonetheless, the unemployment rate continues to fall, since
public employment does not fall, and labor force participation falls
persistently, as lower wages mean that household members find it
optimal to stay at home and enjoy leisure.
Overall, rigidities in the reallocation of jobseekers from the pub-
lic to the private sector imply that fiscal consolidation through cuts
in the public wage bill is more difficult to implement and comes at
the cost of higher unemployment in the case of vacancy cuts and
lower private employment in the case of wage cuts.
4.2 Price Rigidities
We have seen that fiscal consolidation through the public wage bill
induces changes in relative prices, which, under a fixed exchange rate
regime, plays a role in the reallocation of resources within the mon-
etary union. This is particularly true at the ZLB, when monetary
policy cannot undo changes in relative prices induced by asymmetric
fiscal shocks and, as a result, the degree of price stickiness becomes
important for the effects of fiscal consolidation.
The green dashed lines in figures 9A and 9B depict the responses
when we assume that the degree of price rigidities increases for both
regions by setting χ = 0.85. It is clear that price rigidities matter
for the success of the consolidation at the ZLB. The larger the share
of firms that cannot change their prices on impact, the weaker the
negative effects of the demand shocks on inflation and the milder
the necessary consolidation. However, this result is reversed when
the degree of price stickiness is asymmetric between member states.
The red dotted lines in figures 9A and 9B depict the responses when
we assume that the degree of price rigidities increases only in the
periphery. In this case, consolidation effort decreases in the short
run, as inflation moves less than in the benchmark model. Still,
higher price stickiness in the periphery implies larger effects from the
negative demand shocks. The relative inability of prices to adjust in
the periphery induces a reversal of the internal devaluation, meaning
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which significantly reduces
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Figure 9. Higher Price Stickiness (PS)
at the Zero Lower Bound
A.
B.
Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panels reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
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net exports. This effect is then mirrored in the response of tradable
output and employment.20
Overall, a higher degree of price rigidities in the periphery implies
an additional channel, which operates through an appreciation of
the real exchange rate, with adverse effects on net exports, output,
private employment, and unemployment.
4.3 The Productivity of the Public Good
So far, we have assumed that the public good, ygt , does not play
any role in the economy. As an alternative, following Barro (1990)
and Turnovsky (1999), we allow the public good, ygt , to enter the
production function, taken as exogenous by the firms. To this end,
we augment the private production function to
ypt = (n
p
t )
1−φ(xtk
p
t )
φ(ygt )
ν . (41)
The parameter ν regulates how the public input affects private pro-
duction: when ν is zero, the government good is unproductive. This
parameter is crucial in determining the effects of consolidation, even
in normal times. When ν > 0, fiscal consolidation in this environ-
ment reduces the productive capacity of the firms by reducing the
public good, and at the same time induces a positive wealth effect,
which raises private demand and therefore private labor demand.
Hence, ν is at the center of the balance between two opposite effects
on private production.
The green dashed lines in figures 10A and 10B compare the
responses of the baseline model against the responses when we
assume that ν = 0.15. When the public good is productive, the
reduction in the public wage bill implies a drop in the marginal prod-
uct of labor, and this leads to a bigger fall in private wages. For both
instruments, there is a bigger contraction in household consumption
and investment, and ultimately a much larger and more persistent
drop in tradable output. In the case of vacancy cuts, where pub-
lic employment, and hence public output, falls more significantly,
20In the online appendix we show that asymmetries in wage stickiness, or in the
mobility of jobseekers across sectors, are less important for our results. We also
show that the degree of price stickiness is inconsequential during normal times,
as monetary policy will always react to undo possible rigidities stemming from
price dispersion.
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Figure 10. The Role of the Public Good
at the Zero Lower Bound
A.
B.
Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panels reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
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the differences are much starker. In this case, the reallocation of
jobseekers towards the private sector in the medium to long run is
smaller, since the expected return from working in the private sec-
tor is now smaller. Similarly, the fact that the consolidation reduces
the productivity of private jobs lowers the expected returns from
an additional hire for the firm, and, as a result, private vacancies
fall more in this case, inducing a bigger drop in private employment.
More specifically, the initial drop in private employment is larger and
its subsequent evolution is always below baseline, raising the unem-
ployment rate considerably and persistently. With public wage cuts,
since public employment does not fall by as much when compared to
the case of vacancy cuts, this channel of amplification through the
productivity of the public good is less important. The fact that the
consolidation decreases private productivity also implies that there
is no internal devaluation after vacancy cuts: the real exchange rate
even appreciates after the liquidity trap.21
In summary, when the public good is productive, there is a big-
ger fall in the private wage, consumption, investment, and tradable
output. For vacancy cuts, the impact on the responses of private
employment and the unemployment rate is more pronounced.
4.4 Particularities of the Open Economy
In this section we explore the open-economy dimension of the
model—in particular, investigating the sensitivity of our findings to
changes in the degree of trade elasticity and the relative size of the
member country implementing consolidation within the monetary
union.
4.4.1 Elasticity of Trade
There is no strong consensus from the empirical literature regarding
the value of the elasticity of substitution between home-produced
and imported goods, γ. Some recent contributions have suggested
low values for this parameter, in some cases with estimates well
below one. The green dashed lines in figures 11A and 11B show
the impulse response functions for the case when this elasticity is
21In results we present in the online appendix, we show that assuming that the
public good provides utility to the households by being a substitute of private
consumption does not significantly affect our baseline results.
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Figure 11. The Role of Openness
at the Zero Lower Bound
A.
B.
Notes: Responses are in percent deviations from steady state, except for interest
rates and inflation, which are in annualized levels; the share of public jobseekers,
which is in percentage-point deviation from steady state; and net exports, which
are in levels. The line with diamond markers on the top-left panels reports the
path for the debt-to-GDP target.
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reduced from 1.5 to 0.5, implying complementarity between traded
goods.
With the foreign and domestic goods as complements, the inter-
nal devaluation no longer leads to a substitution of both domes-
tic and foreign demand towards the domestically produced good.
Instead, it contracts demand for both types of goods in the periph-
ery. The fall in domestic demand produces a larger fall in domes-
tic inflation, resulting in a bigger exchange rate depreciation and a
larger rise in net exports.22 The deflationary pressures increase the
debt burden, rendering consolidation more difficult to achieve and
increasing its associated costs. Note in particular that, for vacancy
cuts, the unemployment rate increases significantly when domestic
and foreign goods are assumed to be complements.
In conclusion, complementarity between home-produced and
imported goods implies that the deflationary pressures increase the
debt burden, rendering consolidation more costly.
4.4.2 The Relative Size of Member Countries
The red dash-dotted lines in figures 11A and 11B show the implica-
tions of increasing the size of the periphery to 50 percent of the mon-
etary union. Since we assume that net foreign assets are zero in the
steady state, increasing the size of the periphery also implies reduc-
ing the home bias in the core.23 Hence the differences in the composi-
tion of CPI across regions are smaller, CPI differentials are reduced,
and this dampens the adjustment of the real exchange rate. Further-
more, although final good producers in the periphery still substitute
between domestic and foreign retail goods, their demand now repre-
sents a bigger share of total demand for foreign goods and, therefore,
affects foreign prices more. In the short to medium run, this benefits
firms in the periphery, and it translates to a slightly smaller adjust-
ment in private demand, particularly in investment. This, in turn,
helps the consolidation effort and reduces the adjustment of both
fiscal instruments required to meet the debt target.
22The results of the fall in domestic demand are clearly illustrated in the online
appendix, where we plot the sensitivity of results to changes in the trade elasticity
in normal times. For a lower elasticity of trade, consumption and investment fall
after the consolidation since agents cannot substitute domestic for foreign goods
and this results in downward pressures on inflation.
23For n = 0.5 and  = 0.85, we have  = 0.85.
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Hence, we conclude that it is easier to consolidate for larger
countries in a monetary union, although the associated relative dif-
ferences are small.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In this paper, we have set up a DSGE model of a monetary union
with search-and-matching frictions, nominal rigidities, and public
employment, to study the effects of fiscal consolidation through cuts
in the public wage bill in a low-inflation environment. Our model
allows us to study non-trivial reallocation of agents both in and
out of the labor force and between the public and private sector.
In normal times, a reduction in the government wage bill induces a
reallocation of labor towards the private sector, due to the contrac-
tion in the public sector, and so pushes down on private wages in
the medium run. This leads to an internal devaluation within the
monetary union, which, along with the positive wealth effect from
the cut in government expenditure, raises aggregate demand and so
implies an expansion in the private sector.
In a low-inflation environment, induced by negative demand
shocks, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises, so larger fiscal cuts are needed
to lower this ratio. Given the expansionary effects this has for the
private sector, consolidation helps the recovery of the economy in
a liquidity trap in the medium to long run. Nonetheless, with the
contraction in demand, the private sector is much more limited in its
ability to absorb the workers leaving the public sector, so the expan-
sionary effects of the consolidation are contained. On the other hand,
the effects of consolidation on the unemployment rate depend on the
fiscal instrument used at the ZLB: while public wage cuts quickly and
effectively reduce the unemployment rate, public vacancy cuts lead
to a significant and more persistent rise in the unemployment rate.
5.2 Policy Implications
Our findings can be used as a roadmap for successful fiscal consolida-
tions through cuts in the public wage bill. First, since vacancy cuts
have indirect and lagged effects on the dynamics of the private wage
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and no effects for the public wage, they could be more easily imple-
mented. In normal times, they also decrease unemployment relative
to wage cuts and, moreover, generate more persistent increases in
employment, output, and net exports. Clearly, in terms of imple-
mentability but also long-run effects, consolidating through vacancy
cuts in normal times presents certain advantages. At the ZLB, the
two instruments deliver similar outcomes apart from unemployment
that decreases for wage cuts and remains high for vacancy cuts.
This creates a tradeoff for policymakers that must strike a bal-
ance between the easier implementation of unfavorable policies using
vacancy cuts or controlling the rise in unemployment due to the
negative demand shocks using wage cuts.
We point to several factors that matter for the recovery from the
low-inflation environment. The most important are rigidities in the
mobility of unemployed jobseekers between the public and private
sectors and nominal price stickiness. Rigidities in the reallocation of
workers between the two sectors make consolidation through cuts in
the public wage bill more adverse and come at the cost of higher
unemployment in the medium to long run. Hence, the presence of
active labor market policies that can help channel workers from the
public to the private sector are crucial for the success of fiscal con-
solidations like the ones considered in this paper. In a similar sense,
relative price rigidities are also important: higher price stickiness in
the periphery reverses the internal devaluation and leads instead to
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which reinforces the neg-
ative effects of the demand shocks and makes consolidation harder
to achieve. Also in this case, structural reforms that reduce those
types of rigidities would ease consolidations in the periphery. Fur-
thermore, when the public good which is being cut is a productive
factor for the private sector, consolidation is more difficult, since it
reduces the marginal productivity of labor. This pushes down both
on firm’s demand for labor and on household’s supply of labor in
the private sector, and results in a drag on the economy. Thus, pol-
icymakers should consider not only the number but also the quality
of workers when cutting jobs, as well as the sector in which pay cuts
are implemented.
Also, we have compared consolidations through the public wage
bill with traditional instruments of fiscal consolidation considered in
the existing literature, such as tax hikes or government consumption
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cuts. Public wage cuts continue to offer certain advantages in terms
of a fast recovery of the private sector and a reduction in the unem-
ployment rate. Still, in a low-inflation environment, even such a
consolidation policy cannot fully undo the negative effects of the
demand shocks.
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